Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010015992017
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/1574/2017
Sri Bibhu Bhusan Deb Roy,
S/o Late Beni Bhushan Deb Roy,
C/o Late Madhu Sudhan Choiudhury,
Resident of Samshan road (College Road),
P.O. Silchar, P.S. Silchar Sadar,
District-Cachar, Assam.
…..Petitioner .
Versus
1. The State of Assam,
Represented by the Labour Commissioner,
Labour & Employment Department, Gopinath Nagar,
Guwahati-781016, Kamrup (Metro) Assam.
2. M/s Schlumberger Asia Service Limited,
A Company registered under Companies Act, 1956,
Having its registered office at Nazira, near ONGC Complex,
P.O. Nazira, District-Sibsagar, Pin-785685, Assam.
……Respondents.
Page No.# 2/18
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
For the petitioner : Mr. M. Nath …. Senior Advocate.
Ms. D.L. Deka. .... Advocate
For the respondents : Mr. K.N. Choudhury …. Senior Advocate.
Mr. D. Borah .... Advocate.
Dates of hearing : 18.06.2024
Date of Judgment : 28.06.2024
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)
1. Heard Mr. M. Nath, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. D.L. Deka,
learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. D. Borah, learned counsel for the respondent no.2.
2. The petitioner’s case is that pursuant to the order dated 11.02.2013
passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, Cachar in Reference Case No.3/2008,
the petitioner was reinstated back into service w.e.f. 18.04.1990 with full back
wages. However, the petitioner’s grievance is with regard to the calculation
made by the respondents while awarding him the back wages, inasmuch as, the
same has been calculated on the basis of a petitioner’s basic pay at the time of
his termination from service, i.e. @ Rs.390/- per month.
3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner was appointed as Junior
Operator Grade-III in M/s Schlumberger Asia Service Limited, registered under
Page No.# 3/18
the Laws of Hong Kong. The petitioner was appointed on 10.07.1988 and on
01.01.1990, he was placed under suspension followed by his termination from
service w.e.f. 18.04.1990. The dispute between the petitioner and the
respondent no.2 was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, Cachar for
adjudication, wherein it was registered as Reference Case No.3/2008. Reference
Case No.3/2008 was disposed of vide order dated 11.02.2013, by reinstating the
petitioner w.e.f. 18.04.1990 and granting him full back wages. Subsequent to
the above, the respondent no.2 paid Rs.4,75,084.70 to the petitioner as full and
final settlement of the wages. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the
Assistant Labour Commissioner for payment of full back wages amounting to
Rs.2,26,78,177.30, by taking the stand that the respondent no.2 did not include
any increment/allowance or revision of pay while paying the petitioner
Rs.4,75,084.70.
4. The Assistant Labour Commissioner thereafter directed the Certificate
Officer, Sivasagar to recover an amount of Rs.2,26,78,177.30 with interest from
the respondent no.2, vide Certificate dated 14.10.2014.
5. Being aggrieved, the respondent no.2 approached this Court vide WP(C)
6842/2014, praying to set aside the notices and proceedings in Bakijai Case
No.70/2014 initiated on the basis of the said order dated 30.09.2014 issued by
the Assistant Labour Commissioner, for recovery of Rs.2,26,78,177.30.
6. This Court disposed of WP(C) 6842/2014, vide order dated 13.02.2015, by
holding that it was an admitted position that in the adjudication process made
by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, wherein the respondent no.2 was made
Page No.# 4/18
liable to pay to the petitioner Rs.2,26,78,177.30, the respondent no.2 was not
associated in the adjudication process. This Court thereafter disposed of the writ
petition by setting aside the two notices dated 03.12.2014 issued by the
Recovery Officer, Certificate dated 30.09.2014 issued by the Assistant Labour
Commissioner and Bakijai Case no.70/2014. This Court in it’s order dated
13.02.2015 also recorded the fact that the petitioner had undertaken to file an
application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as “1947 Act”) with regard to non-payment of the entire
back wages.
7. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition under Section 33(C)(2) of the
1947 Act, for recovery and realisation of unpaid back wages and also prayed for
computation of the same before the Labour Court, Guwahati. The petition was
registered as Case No.2/2015. Case No.2/2015 was dismissed by the learned
Labour Court, vide Award dated 16.06.2016, by holding that there was no
documentary evidence with regard to the petitioner’s claim for field allowance
and no specific direction was made with regard to the notional increment
payable to the petitioner. Paragraph nos.10, 11 and 12 of the Award dated
16.06.2016 passed in Case No.2/2015 by the Labour Court is reproduced
hereinbelow, as follows :
10. Claimant while adduceing evidence has altogether exhibited 13
“
documents. However except 13 other documents are photostate copies.
Ld. counsel for the opposite party has disputed the genuineness of Ext.13
as there are some correction without seal and signature. As per Ext.13 net
pay of the petitioner at the time of dismissal was Rs.4174/-. Even if the
aforesaid amount is considered to be the salary of petitioner at the time of
dismissal for computing back wages or as to consider his Basic Salary,
D.A., HRA and Field Allowance which has been accepted by management
Page No.# 5/18
side and management has computed the back wages on the aforesaid fact
and salary.
Petitioner has claimed that he is entitled for Field Allowance.
However there is no documentary evidence that he is entitled for Field
Allowance. In the pay slip also there is no mention that he is entitled for
Field Allowance. Apart from that there is no calculation sheet from the
side of petitioner as to how much he is entitled as back wages in different
heads.
11. Ld. Labour Court while passing the award has made it clear that
petitioner is entitled for reinstatement with full back wages from the date
of dismissal. However there is no specific direction as regard the notional
increment of the petitioner. In absence of such specific direction the
requirement of law is that the Executing Court cannot determine
increment notionally. In such circumstances petitioner is not entitled
increment. From the claim petition as well as evidence on record the
admitted position is that petitioner has already received an amount of
Rs.4,52,738/- (Rupees four lakhs fifty two thousand seven hundred &
thirty eight) only as back wages. The said back wages was paid by the
management as follows.
SR. No. Wage components as on 18.04.1990 Amount in Rs.
1. Basic 390
2. DA 312
3. HRA 550
4. Field allowance 331
Total (per month) 1583
Therefore, Rs.1583x23 years and 08 months
= Rs.4,52,738/- (Approx).
The computation made by management is in accordance with pay slip
issued to petitioner and the same is acceptable in view of the facts and
law.”
Page No.# 6/18
8. The petitioner’s counsel submits that back wages includes the benefit of
revised wages or salary and revision of yearly increments, revised Dearness
Allowance and other benefits. In support of the said submission, the learned
Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of State Bank of India & Others vs. T.J. Paul, reported in (1999) 4 SCC
759 and in the case of Gammon India Limited vs. Niranjan Dass, reported
in (1984) 1 SCC 509.
9. The petitioner’s counsel submits that petitioner’s back wages has been
calculated as per wage components given to him as on 18.04.1990. He submits
that the wage components given to the petitioner on 18.04.1990 could not have
been the same in the year 2014. There had to be a revision of pay and payment
of increments during the period of 24 years that he was not in service.
10. The petitioner’s counsel thus prays that the Award dated 16.06.2016
passed by the learned Labour Court, Guwahati in Case No.2/2015 should be set
aside. A direction should also be issued directing the respondent no.2 to pay
back wages to the petitioner, after computing the increments and allowances
due and admissible to the petitioner along with interest w.e.f. 18.04.1990, till his
reinstatement.
11. The petitioner’s counsel submits that on being reinstated into service he
was directed to join in Mumbai. However, on reaching Mumbai he was
threatened with bodily harm and assaulted by workers of the respondent no.2,
due to which he fled from Mumbai and filed an FIR in the Silchar Police Station,
Cachar, Assam. The Silchar Police Station sent the FIR to the concerned Mumbai
Page No.# 7/18
Police Station for taking up necessary follow-up action. Thereafter the petitioner
did not pursue the FIR submitted by him.
12. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.2
submits that there should be an existing dispute between the parties regarding
the determined amount payable by the respondent No.2, prior to the submission
of a petition under Section 33(C)(2) of the 1947 Act. However, there being no
existing dispute with regard to the amount payable by the respondent no.2, the
petition filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court was misplaced. He also
submits that the learned Labour Court having found no materials to prove the
case of the petitioner that there was revision of pay or increment payable to the
petitioner, there was no infirmity in the decision to dismiss the petition under
Section 33(C)(2) of the 1947 Act. He also submits that in the absence of any
specific direction as regard the notional increment payable to the petitioner, it
was not possible for the Executing Court to determine the increment notionally
payable to the petitioner. He also submits that the respondent no.2’s demand for
wage revision/salary increment would purely depend on the following factors :
(a) Schlumberger Annual Performance appraisal (in short
“
‘Schlumberger Appraisal’)
(b) Fix Step Training Program (Promotion)
(c) Overall performance of the Schlumberger group at a global level”
13. Mr. K.N. Choudhury submits that wage revision/salary increment are given
as a result of evaluation of an employee’s performance as per the company
Policy and on an individual basis. He submits that the same is not given across
the board to every employee. As such, there could be no revision of
Page No.# 8/18
salary/increment in the petitioner’s case, as he did not work for the company for
more than 23 years.
14. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.2 further submits that
the petitioner being absent from duty, he cannot claim the benefit of notional
increment during the period of his absence. The petitioner cannot claim
increments only because he has been reinstated into service with benefit of
continuity in service. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of A.P.S.R.T.C. & Another vs. S. Narsagoud,
reported in (2003) 2 SCC 212 and in the case of Andhra Pradesh State
Road Transport Corporation (A.P.S.R.T.C.) & Others vs. Abdul Kareem,
reported in (2005) 6 SCC 36.
15. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that
whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer, any money or
benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is
entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit, the
workman can approach the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the 1947
Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33(C)(2) of the 1947 Act
requires a pre-existing benefit flowing from a pre-existing right. However, in the
present case, the petitioner not having shown any document to show that he is
entitled to some pre-existing benefit or pre-existing right, there is no infirmity
with the dismissal of petitioner under Section 33(C)(2) of the 1947 Act. In this
regard, he had relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Uttar Pradesh & Another vs. Brijpal Singh, reported in (2005) 8
SCC 58. The learned Senior Counsel also submits that where a decision has to
Page No.# 9/18
be made with regard to whether back wages should be awarded, it is necessary
for the employee to plead that he was not gainfully employed from the date of
his termination, only then the burden will shift to the employer. The learned
Senior Counsel submits that as far as he has been informed, the FIR filed by the
petitioner has been quashed by the Mumbai High Court. Further, after taking the
full wages of Rs.4,75,084.70 without protest, the petitioner, who went to
Mumbai, never joined his work, on the plea that his wife was ill.
16. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
17. In the case of Gammon India Limited vs. Niranjan Dass (supra), the
Supreme Court has held that the respondent therein would be entitled to all
back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary, if during the period
there is revision of pay scales with yearly increment, revised Dearness
Allowance or variable Dearness Allowance and all terminal benefits if he has
reached the age of superannuation, such as Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. Back
wages should be calculated as if the respondent therein continued in service
uninterrupted. The respondent therein would also be entitled to leave
encashment and bonus if other workmen in the same category were paid the
same.
18. In the case of State Bank of India & Others vs. T.J. Paul (supra), the
Supreme Court has held that while setting aside the order of removal by the
High Court was sustained and the directions to pay back wages, granting
promotions and monetary benefits by way of salary etc. would also remain.
Page No.# 10/18
19. In the case of A.P.S.R.T.C. & Another vs. S. Narsagoud (supra), the
Supreme Court has referred to the case of State Bank of India vs. Ram
Chandra Dubey and Others, reported in (2000) IILLJ1660SC, wherein the
Supreme Court held that when a reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate the question not only as to whether the termination of a workman is
justified or not but to grant appropriate relief, the same would consist of an
examination of the question whether the reinstatement should be with full or
partial back wages or none. Such a question is one of fact depending upon the
evidence to be produced before the Tribunal. Such questions can be
appropriately examined only in a reference. When a reference is made under
Section 10 of the Act, all incidental questions arising thereto can be determined
by the Tribunal.
20. In the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
(A.P.S.R.T.C.) & Others vs. Abdul Kareem (supra), the Supreme Court
held that it would be incongruous to suggest that an employee, having been
held guilty and remained absent from duty for a long time, continued to earn
increments though there is no payment of wages for the period of absence.
21. In the case of Brijpal Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held that a
workman can proceed under Section 33C(2) only after the Tribunal has
adjudicated on a complaint made under Section 33A or under a reference under
Section 10C, that the order of dismissal was not justified and has reinstated the
workman. Further, in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh
ChandMANU/SC/0273/1978, the Supreme Court has held that the right to
the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to
Page No.# 11/18
be computed must be an existing one, that is to say already adjudicated upon
or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship
between the Industrial workman and his employer. The Supreme Court further
held that it is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under
Section 33C(2), to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and
entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right, but which may
appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference
under Section 10 of the Act.
22. As can be seen from the various judgments referred to above, the
petitioner would be entitled to revision of his pay and increment etc., provided
there was revision of pay scales made for similarly placed employees. However,
in the present case, the respondents have taken a stand that revision of salary
and increments are given on the basis of an individual employee’s performance.
In the present case, there has been no revision or any increment given to the
petitioner, as he had not worked for more than 23 years. Further, even after he
had been asked to work in the year 2014, the petitioner did not join his post on
the ground that he had been threatened with physical harm by his co-workers in
Mumbai. There is nothing to show that the petitioner’s allegation is true. No
document has been submitted by the petitioner to show that there has been
revision of pay and increments applicable to him.
23. In the Award dated 16.06.2016, passed by the Labour Court, Guwahati in
Case No.2/2015 [under Section 33C(2)], the learned Labour Court has after
going through the evidence recorded, held that there was no document or
calculation sheet from the side of the petitioner, showing as to how he was
entitled to be paid back wages in different heads. Further, while the learned
Page No.# 12/18
Labour Court had reinstated the petitioner in service in Reference Case
No.3/2008, there was no specific direction as regards the notional increments
payable to the petitioner. In the absence of specific direction, it was not possible
to come to a finding that the petitioner was to be given any revision of his pay
or any increment was payable to him. As such, the learned Labour Court found
no merit in the petition made by the petitioner under Section 33C(2). In the
present writ petition also, there is nothing produced by the petitioner to show
that there was any revision of pay.
24. On considering the facts of this case, this Court is of the view that basic
pay of Rs.390/- that has been given to the petitioner as Junior Operator Grade-
III could have increased with passage of time. However, no documents have
been furnished by the petitioner to show as to how he is entitled to be given a
higher pay or increments. The only document that appears to slightly favour the
petitioner is Ext.-13, which is supposedly a pay slip, has been disputed by the
respondents. A perusal of Ext.-13 shows that a name has been scratched out
and another added by pen and no signature with seal recognizing the said
change is discernible. There is no seal and date, except for the month
“December” and the year “1989." This Court does not find any infirmity with the
learned Labour Court not acting upon Ext.-13, as the genuineness of the
contents of the same is not proved. Though the learned Labour Court was to
make a finding with regard to Ext.-13, no finding has been made by it. The
earnings of the petitioner as per Ext.-13, which is the pay slip for December,
1989, states as follows-
“EARNINGS FACTORS AMT-(Rs.) DEDUCTIONS AMT-(Rs.)
Page No.# 13/18
BASIC SALARY 390.00
DEARNESS ALLOWANCE 312.00 CO’S CONT. TO PPF 70.00
HRA * 1 550.00 EMP’S CONT. TO PPF 230.00
PPF COMPANY’S SHARE 70.00 INCOME TAX 0.00
FILED ALL 331.00
GEOGR BONUS 1.2 140.00
OVERTIME (NORMAL) 182.00 1,389.00
RFT-WST-TCP 450.00 --------------
ANNUAL BONUS * 1 842.00 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 300.00
--------------
------------------- **** NET PAY: 4,174.00
GROSS EARNINGS 4,474.00 * PAYMENT METHOD-CHEQUE
25. The above shows that the basic salary of the petitioner was Rs.390/- and
his DA was Rs.312/-. He was also entitled to HRA @Rs.550/- and field allowance
of Rs.331/-. There cannot be payment for over time, in view of the fact that the
petitioner never worked after his dismissal from service. There is also no
question of annual bonus or other bonuses being paid to the petitioner for the
same reason. Further, the question of bonuses, overtime etc. cannot be an
everyday affair and would depend upon the actual work done. As such, this
Court does not find any infirmity in the learned Labour Court having accepted
the computation of the petitioner’s back wages in terms of-
Page No.# 14/18
1. Basic 390
2. DA 312
3. HRA 550
4. Field allowance _331
Total (per month) 1583
26. As stated earlier, no other document is there to prove or compute the back
wages payable to the petitioner, except the amounts indicated above.
27. We have to realize that the appeal made to this Court against a judicial or
quasi judicial Tribunal or body and the control exercised by this Court would be
limited to a supervisory capacity. It cannot act as an appellate authority by
reviewing or reweighing the evidence. In the case of Hari Bishnu Kamath
vs. Ahmed Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 SC 233, this Court held
in paragraph 21 and 23 as follows :
21. … On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as
“
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction
or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued
when the court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted
jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the
parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The
court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not
appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not
review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if
they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a court which has
jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well
as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy,
if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute
Page No.# 15/18
its own findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and are
not in dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
23. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be
issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be
manifest on the face of the record. … The fact is that what is an error
apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or
exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very
nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each
case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In the case of Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of
Saurashtra and Ors., reported in AIR 1957 SC 264, the Supreme Court has
held that the decision of a Tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction
to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution, unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported by
evidence.
29. In the case of Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills
Limited Vs. S. Viswanathan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Supreme
Court in Para 12 held as follows:-
12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case
“
may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a
finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence
Page No.# 16/18
the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article
227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the
Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is
necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends
reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the
order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of
factual disputes and finding given thereon.…”
30. In the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences &
Another vs. Bikartan Das & Others, Civil Appeal No.3339/2023, the
Supreme Court has held that there are two cardinal principles of law governing
the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The first being that when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari, the High
Court does not exercise the powers of an Appellate Tribunal. It does not review
or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the Tribunal purports
to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction
or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute it’s own views for those of the
Tribunal. A writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the
face of the record and the same being a prerogative writ, it should not be issued
on the mere asking. The second cardinal principle is that even if some action or
order challenged is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court can refuse to
upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties under
Article 226, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury.
31. Paragraph 61 and 62 of the above said judgment are reproduced
hereinbelow, as follows :
61. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of the
“
Page No.# 17/18
observations of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra) on this point, which
are as follows:
Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by
“
an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation
of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it,
or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons
which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors
of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the
record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it
is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ
court would not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own
conclusion of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a
court or a tribunal. A finding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded
by a court or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before 52 the court or the tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. It is also well settled
that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot be
agitated before the writ court.”
62. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the
decision of this Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B.
Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, reported in AIR 2000
SC 1508. This Court observed as under:
The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly
“…
constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be
considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere
reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient
Page No.# 18/18
or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings
at any rate, as long as they are based upon such materials which
are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet
another view which can be reasonably and possibly undertaken. …”
32. The above being said, the cross-examination of the petitioner shows that
he has admitted to the fact that he does not have any document or mode of
calculation to back his claim that he is entitled to payment of back wages
amounting to more than Rs.2 Crores. The petitioner has not submitted any
document to back his claim that he is entitled to back wages of above Rs.2
Crores. He has also admitted in his cross-examination as follows:-
No calculation sheet backing my claim has been submitted.”
“
The Labour Court has accepted the computation of the petitioner’s wages
only in respect of the Basic Pay, DA, HRA and Field Allowance.
33. On considering the fact that this Court cannot act as an appellate authority
unless the reasoning of the learned Labour Court is found to be perverse, this
Court does not find any reason to interfere with the Award passed by the
learned Labour Court, in the absence of evidence/documents proving the case
of the petitioner that he is entitled to back wages above Rs.2 Crores.
34. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant